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Individual Investor Sentiment and Stock Returns - What Do We
Learn from Warrant Traders?
Abstract
In this paper, we propose a measure of individual investor sentiment that is derived from the
market for bank-issued warrants. Due to a unique warrant transaction data set from a large discount
broker we are able to calculate a daily sentiment measure and test whether individual investor sen-
timent is related to daily stock returns by using vector autoregressive models and Granger causality
tests. We find that there exists a mutual influence of sentiment and stock market returns, but only in
the very short-run (one and two trading days). Returns have a negative influence on sentiment, while
the influence of sentiment on returns is positive for the next trading day. The influence of stock mar-
ket returns on sentiment is stronger than vice versa. Our sentiment measure simultaneously avoids
problems that are associated with existing sentiment measures, which are based on the closed-end
fund discount, stock market transactions, the put-call ratio or investor surveys.
Keywords: Sentiment, Bank-issued Warrants, Covered Warrants, Individual Investors, Investor Behavior
JEL Classification Code: G1
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1 Introduction
What influences the expectations of investors about future stock prices, and do these
beliefs predict future stock returns? We shed light on these questions by deriving an
aggregated measure of expectations for one group of investors. Our measure is based on
the individual holdings of bank-issued warrants by private investors who are customers of
a large German online broker.
Traditional models in finance assume that deviations of security prices from their fun-
damental values can immediately be exploited by sophisticated rational investors. These
investors recognize and exploit deviations from fundamental values by buying undervalued
and selling overvalued stocks and thus moving prices back to their fundamental values.
Less sophisticated investors, or those who trade on other than fundamental information,
are classified as irrational or noise traders. In the neoclassical framework the above men-
tioned arbitrage mechanism leads to the conclusion that irrational investors cannot influ-
ence equilibrium prices, earn inferior returns, and are thus driven out of the market in the
long-run.1 However, DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) show that in the
presence of noise traders, the mechanism of arbitrage is disturbed. If noise traders create
stochastic noise that does not cancel out in aggregate, rational traders are confronted with
an additional source of risk because noise traders may move prices even further away from
fundamentals. In this situation, arbitrage is no longer risk-free for rational investors with
a finite investment horizon. The consequence of this noise trader risk is that deviations
from fundamentals can persist in the long-run. Since it is hard to determine what the
equilibrium fundamental value of an asset is, noise trader models do not provide us with
precise hypotheses regarding the direction and magnitude of the influence of investor sen-
timent on security prices or how investor sentiment is determined. However, these models
imply that stock returns influence investor sentiment and that investor sentiment can
influence stock returns. Since it is essential to differentiate between groups of investors,
we look at expectations of one special group of investors - namely individual investors
from a big German online broker. Usually, those investors fit the definition of a noise
trader, because it is unlikely that they have better information than other market partic-
1Kogan, Ross, Wang, and Westerfield (2006), however, show that price impact of irrational traders does not depend on
their long-run survival and they can have a significant impact on asset prices even when their wealth becomes negligible.
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ipants (i.e. institutional investors). They do not have the time or money to obtain, nor
the ability to interpret all available information. Thus, they might be especially prone to
the usage of heuristics, rules of thumb, or other simplifying decision rules in their invest-
ment decisions. Furthermore, various studies have shown that individual investors suffer
from different cognitive biases (e.g., the disposition effect or the overconfidence bias).
They also demonstrate too much optimism in their expectations about future outcomes
of stock prices (e.g. Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982), Barberis and Thaler (2003),
and Glaser and Weber (2004)), which indicates that individual investors are most likely
not fully rational. Therefore, the noise within the group of individual investors could be
dependent on a non-fundamental variable - the investor sentiment. We investigate whether
this sentiment is influenced by stock market returns or whether, in turn, the expectations
of private investors influence returns of big and small company stocks.
What exactly do we define as investor sentiment? It is the expectation of investors regard-
ing the price of one or more financial assets that is not based on fundamental information.
An additional necessary condition for investor sentiment to influence equilibrium prices is
that this sentiment is correlated within a group of investors. One can think of investor sen-
timent as the way a group of investors thinks about, for example, the future development
of stock prices, which is not justified by rationality. In other words, the above mentioned
models state that a group of investors whose beliefs are influenced by non-fundamental
factors in a correlated way may affect the valuation of assets. There is a large volume
of empirical literature, comprehensively discussed in Section 3, that analyzes the mutual
influence between stock returns and investor sentiment measures. Empirical studies differ
in various dimensions. Most importantly, studies usually differ in the way they measure
investor sentiment. This might be one reason why the results concerning the relation be-
tween stock returns and investor sentiment measures are mixed. Furthermore, existing
sentiment measures are subject to several methodological problems. Individual investor
sentiment measures based on stock transactions face the problem that, due to short sale
constraints, it is harder to express negative sentiment for a stock through a sale compared
to expressing positive sentiment through a purchase. In addition, it is difficult to calcu-
late individual investor sentiment measures based on aggregate transaction data, since
it is impossible to disentangle individual investors’ transactions from the transactions of
other investor groups, such as institutional investors. Survey based sentiment measures
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are confronted with the problem that investors might act differently in the market, where
real money is at stake, as compared to questionnaire answers. These problems will be
addressed in detail later in the paper.
In this paper, we propose a measure of individual investor sentiment that is derived from
the market for bank-issued warrants. We compare the number of investors who hold call
warrants (positive expectations about the future price of the underlying) to investors
who hold put warrants (negative expectations) on an individual level. Analyzing warrant
transactions has a clear advantage in terms of inferring investors’ expectations by their
trading decisions when compared to the analysis of stock transactions.2 The decision
to sell a stock can have several reasons apart from the expectation that the respective
stock price will decline in the future. Examples include the demand for liquidity, portfolio
rebalancing, or the (irrational) reluctance to sell stocks with a loss.
In contrast, the purchase of a put warrant is a clear sign that investors expect falling prices
of the underlying. A obvious counterargument to this revelation of negative expectations
could be that another motive for holding a put warrant might be hedging. There are
several points that make it unlikely that hedging is the main focus of individual investors
in the warrant market. The first is that the median holding period for all warrants in
our data set is only 9 days and even less (6 days) for put warrants. In addition, Bartram
and Fehle (2003) showed, by looking at the level and difference of bid and ask prices on
the warrant and option market, that it is more likely that hedgers trade on the option
market, while speculators trade on the warrant market. In a survey of a weekly investor
magazine and a German discount broker, 4,345 individual investors were asked for their
motives to trade warrants. Only 8% stated that hedging was their main motive to buy
warrants.3 Another point is that a direct hedge4 was not possible for the DAX5, since
private investors were not able to replicate the DAX in their portfolio.6 All together,
2The sentiment measures that are based on stock transactions compare stock purchases and sales (see e.g. Kaniel, Saar,
and Titman (2004) and Kumar and Lee (2002)). They do so because private investors rarely hold short positions in stocks.
3See Klotz (2004), p. 16.
4“Direct hedge” means holding the underlying and a put on the same underlying.
5The DAX is the stock index for the 30 biggest listed German companies.
6Today, exchange traded funds give individual investors the opportunity to hold a whole index at relatively low costs.
This was not possible in Germany during our sample period.
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we think that hedging only plays a minor role, if any at all, in the market for bank-
issued warrants. Even if investors buy warrants to hedge their long-term investment in
the underlying with a put in the short-run, this means nothing else than that they see an
increased possibility of a decline in the price of the underlying in the short-run. This is a
change in their short-term sentiment.
Due to a unique warrant transaction data set from a large German discount broker, we
are able to calculate our sentiment measure on a daily basis and test whether individual
investor sentiment is related to daily stock returns by using vector autoregressive models
and Granger causality tests. We argue that our sentiment measure simultaneously avoids
the problems mentioned above, which are associated with existing sentiment measures.
We find that there exists a mutual influence between sentiment and stock market returns
in the very short-run (one to two trading days). Returns have a negative influence on
individual investor sentiment, which in turn influences the return of the following day
positively. This means that private warrant investors act as contrarians and that their
expectations about the underlyings are correct in the short-run. The impact of stock
market returns on sentiment is stronger than vice versa. We find no evidence for stronger
influence of sentiment on small stock returns than big stock returns as it was suggested
by different authors.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we start with a description
of the institutional characteristics of bank-issued warrants in Germany. Section 3 provides
a comprehensive overview of the literature in the field of investor sentiment. In Section
4, the data set and the methodology are described. Empirical results are reported and
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Characteristics of Bank-issued Warrants
Bank-issued warrants8 (warrants hereafter) securitize the right, but not the obligation, to
buy (call) or sell (put) a certain amount of the underlying security for a preconcerted price
7See e.g. Kumar and Lee (2002) and Neal and Wheatley (1998).
8Sometimes the synonyms covered warrants or third-party warrants are used.
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up to (American-style warrant) or on (European-style warrant) a preconcerted maturity
date. The payoff structure of those warrants is the same as for plain-vanilla options,
although warrants are legally obligations from the issuer directly to the owner.9 These
typical retail banking products are issued by financial institutions only and are bought
(almost) exclusively by individual investors. In contrast, traditional warrants are issued
by the same company that issued the underlying of the warrant.10 Since short-selling (i.e.
issuing) warrants is impossible for individual investors, no margin accounts are required
and the size of the contracts is much smaller than in the options markets. Typically,
the owner of one warrant has the right to buy or sell one-tenth or one-hundredth of the
underlying with this contract (expressed by the conversion ratio), resulting in a median
price of 1.45 Euro per warrant in our sample. Furthermore, transaction costs are close to
those of stocks (median transaction costs per trade are 12.06 Euro), which makes warrants
affordable for individual investors. The buying and selling procedure for the warrants is
similar to that of stocks. Customers of the online broker trade these warrants within the
same technical environment that they are used to from trading stocks. There is no need
for an additional (margin) account to trade warrants. The only additional requirement is
that you sign a form where you confirm that you are aware of the risks associated with
these kind of securities.11
Bank-issued warrants are well-known securities in continental Europe, Australia and in
some markets in Asia. They are less common in the UK12 and not existent in the US.
By far the largest market for warrants with regard to listed securities (see Figure 1)
as well as turnover exists in Germany. In 2000, the premium turnover13 of warrants on
9While in the option market a clearing institution fulfills the obligations of a writer of an option who fails to fulfill his
obligation, there is no such institution in the warrant market. Since all issuers in the warrant market are financial institutions
this default risk should be small and have only minor price impacts.
10Traditional warrants are usually issued in combination with a bond (so called warrant-linked bond). They give the
warrant holder the right, but not the obligation, to acquire shares of the issuing company and thus are always call warrants.
11This so called Termingescha¨ftsfa¨higkeit has to be renewed every other year, just by signing the form again.
12In 2002 the London Stock Exchange announced to create a special market place for warrants to make them better
available for private investors. See McHattie Group (2002), p. 2.
13The premium of a warrant is the amount an investor pays for the right to buy or sell the underlying for the strike price.
Since warrants are nothing else but the price of this right the premium is equal to the price of the warrant. The turnover
data is the sum of all traded premiums within a year and not the sum of the values of the underlyings on which one holds
the right.
7
German exchanges was 83.30 billion Euros, which accounted for approximately 1.5% of
total exchange turnover in Germany.14 Another indicator of the importance of warrants
in the German market is the growth of the number of securities. While 100 warrants were
listed in different German market places in 1990, this number rapidly increased to 4,500 at
the beginning of our sample period in January 1997. At the end of our sample period (mid
of April 2001), 23,500 warrants were listed in Germany, and this number grew to 29,000 in
August 2005.15 Why are there so many warrants? Unlike options, warrants are not written
on demand, but are rather issued, similar to bonds, on one particular date in a quantity
defined in advance. Regardless of whether all warrants are sold at the day of issuance,
they can be traded anytime within their lifespan. Furthermore, an issuing institution does
not normally offer only one warrant with one strike price on one underlying but rather a
whole series of warrants on one underlying. The warrants in a series vary with respect to
the type of the warrant (i.e. call or put), the strike price and the maturity date.16 Every
single security that was designed in such a way is listed as a separate warrant with a
separate ISIN. As a result, there is a large heterogeneity of securities in the market for
bank-issued warrants.
This high degree of diversity of warrants causes some coordination problems that are
addressed by a strong market maker structure in this market. The market makers, i.e.
the issuing banks, are committed to providing liquidity for their own products, because
otherwise, high costs of finding a contract partner within the group of individual investors
could cause a market breakdown. They do so by quoting bid and ask prices for their
warrants permanently. Although the issuers are free with regard to the level of prices, they
are restricted in the maximum bid/ask-spread17 and the minimum number of securities
they are willing to buy or sell for the bid or ask price.18 The consequence is that individual
14See Voirin (2001), p. 2.
15In comparison, only 5,800 stocks are listed on the largest German stock exchange in Frankfurt.
16Since the option market is much more regulated with respect to contract size and maturity dates less different options
exist, resulting in more liquidity for these derivatives.
17Often the market makers commit to quote spreads not greater than 2% of the absolute value of the warrant. However,
some defined special situations exist where the market makers could deviate from this rule (e.g. if prices are very low in
absolute terms and the smallest price unit (usually one cent) is already more than the maximum spread).
18Bartram and Fehle (2003) compare bid/ask spreads of similar derivatives on the German warrant and option markets
and find that prices are higher but spreads are smaller in the market for bank-issued warrants. They conclude that it is
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investors predominately trade directly with the market maker.19
The structure of the market for bank-issued warrants implies that investors are not able
to issue these assets (i.e. sell them short). That makes arbitrage virtually impossible in
this market. This is because the seller of the warrants is always a financial institution. It is
very unlikely that they would sell a warrant for less than its theoretical price, and rational
investors could only gain from arbitrage, if the warrants would be “too cheap”. On the
other hand, the issuers can vary the prices freely, including the possibility to raise prices
if investors’ demand is high for these products. However, since they are committed to a
maximum spread, they also have to buy back the warrants for the higher price, making
it less attractive for the issuers to quote high prices if the demand is high.20
3 Related Literature
As stated before, many empirical investigations with different measures of investor senti-
ment have been conducted in the last decade. However, the results of these investigations
have been mixed. Some studies have found an influence of sentiment on market returns
and other studies have not. In that context, a very important question is whether the
used proxies for investor sentiment represent appropriate measures. In this section, we
first shed light on the advantages and disadvantages of these measures of investor senti-
ment and report empirical results afterwards. In the next section, we demonstrate how
we address the methodological problems and why our measure of investor sentiment can
simultaneously circumvent the most severe measurement problems.
more likely that institutional investors (i.e. hedgers) trade on the option while individuals (i.e. speculators) trade on the
warrant market.
19Both big market places for warrants in Germany, the European Warrant Exchange (Euwax) and the Deutsche Bo¨rse
Frankfurt, implemented mechanisms that guarantee that buy and sell offers from individual investors are matched if they
fall within the quoted spread from the market maker, resulting in a better price than if the individuals would have traded
with the market maker directly.
20Wilkens, Erner, and Ro¨der (2003) find that for similar products which are traded on the same markets as warrants (i.e.
discount certificates and reverse convertibles), prices are too high at the beginning of the lifespan of these products but
convert to their fair values as they approach maturity. Their order-flow hypothesis states that this is due to that fact that
at the beginning of the lifespan the risk that many investors sell back their warrants to the issuer is smaller than at the end
of the lifespan, simply because less products are outstanding.
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The proxies for investor sentiment used in the literature can be divided into two main
categories.21 One the one hand, there are indicators that are derived from financial mar-
kets. They can be subdivided into clientele-specific indicators derived from the behavior of
individual or professional investors (e.g. transactions and portfolio holdings) and market-
wide indicators. The latter imply micro- (e.g. book-to-market ratio) and macro-economic
(e.g. interest rates) data as well as proxies from the fund (e.g. closed-end fund discounts),
derivatives (e.g. put/call ratio), and IPO (e.g. IPO volume) markets and other time-series
data (e.g. liquidity, momentum).22 On the other hand, there are direct sentiment measures
which are derived from weekly or monthly questionnaire surveys among institutional and
individual investors, managers or consumers.23
The most prominent proxy for individual investor sentiment is the closed-end fund dis-
count (CEFD) proposed by DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) and Lee,
Shleifer, and Thaler (1991). It is an empirical fact that closed-end funds are, on aver-
age, traded with a substantial discount on the net asset value (NAV) of the stocks in
their portfolios. Rational reasons that are consistent with the neoclassical theory (e.g.
agency costs) seem to be insufficient to explain the magnitude and the time variation of
the discount. Since closed-end funds are predominantly traded by individual investors,
their sentiment should affect the CEFD.24 If individual investors become more optimistic
(pessimistic) about stocks, they affect prices on the market somehow, depending on the
portion of their aggregated demand. The higher the trading volume of individual investors
in comparison with professional investors, the higher the influence of these individuals on
the stock price is.25 If the proportion of individual and institutional investors in the whole
market and in the market for closed-end funds were the same, the discount would not
21One exception from this categorization is the work of Edmans, Garcia, and Norli (2006). They derive sentiment from
the results of international soccer matches and show an asymmetric effect on stock returns. Domestic markets decline the
next day if the national team looses while there is no significant stock market reaction after a victory.
22See Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004), Kumar and Lee (2002), Rath, Tebroke, and Tietze (2004), Wang, Keswani, and
Taylor (2006), Baker and Wurgler (2004), and Baker and Stein (2003).
23E.g. the ZEW Financial Market Survey (for details see http://www.zew.de), surveys by the American Association
of Individual Investors (AAII) (for details see http://www.aaii.com), the Ifo Business Climate Index (for details see
http://www.cesifo.de), and the Michigan Consumer Confidence Index (for details see http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu).
24See Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), p. 82.
25This is why primarily small stocks with low institutional holdings are believed to be influenced by individual investor
sentiment.
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change if individuals became more optimistic (pessimistic). However, since mainly indi-
viduals buy closed-end funds, the discount should decrease (increase) because prices of
the assets on the market are undervalued (overvalued) from the perspective of individual
investors.26 Based on these assumptions, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) find that the
CEFD measures individual investor sentiment and that this sentiment is able to forecast
monthly stock returns, especially of stocks that are predominantly held and traded by in-
dividual investors, e.g. small stocks, in the years from 1965 to 1985. In a larger sample from
1933 to 1993, Neal and Wheatley (1998) find a positive relation between CEFD and small
firm returns but no relation with returns of larger firms. They conclude that the CEFD
is able to predict the size premium.27 They also test other proxies for investor sentiment,
namely net mutual fund redemptions and the ratio of odd-lot sales and purchases, with
the result that redemptions are also able to forecast the size premium while the odd-lot
ratio is not. There are also some critical views on CEFD as a proxy for investor sentiment
and the influence on stock prices. For example Swaminathan (1996) finds in the extended
data (1965-1990) of Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) that the CEFD can indeed forecast
small stock returns. However, the discount contains fundamental economic information
about small firm earnings growth rates and future inflation, and thus, it is not a measure
of sentiment but “a proxy of individual investors’ rational expectations about future eco-
nomic conditions and/or their risk aversion to macroeconomic risks”.28 Ross (2002) shows
that if one interprets the management fees of closed-end funds as options on the NAV of
the respective fund, the level of the discount could be explained within the neoclassical
framework.29 Elton, Gruber, and Busse (1998) find that the CEFD is not an important
factor in the stock return generating process at all. Similar results are provided by Doukas
and Milonas (2004). They do not find evidence for investor sentiment, measured by the
CEFD, affecting the risk of common stocks in the Greek stock and closed-end fund market
from 1997 to 2002. Qui and Welch (2004) obtain similar results. In their 1965 to 2003
sample, they can not find forecasting power of the CEFD for retail-stock return spreads,
26Note that a measurement of the private investors influence is only possible if one can differentiate the clienteles (e.g.
institutional and individual investors) in the market.
27The difference between small and large firm returns.
28Swaminathan (1996), p. 882.
29Although it is unclear how the intertemporal variation of the discount and the empirical fact that in some periods
closed-end funds are traded with a negative discount, i.e. premium, could be explained within this theoretical framework.
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retail-stock low-trading return spreads, and post-1985 small-stock return spreads. In con-
trast to the CEFD, the survey-based Michigan consumer confidence index (MCCI) can
explain these changes and therefore is preferred by the authors as a sentiment indicator
over the CEFD.30
The latter study leads to the second category of measures for investor sentiment. Several
studies test survey-based proxies for sentiment and their correlation with stock market
returns. Otoo (1999) uses the MCCI and finds that in the period of 1980 to 1999 this indi-
cator is influenced by returns of a broad stock market index (Wilshire 5000) on a monthly
basis. This is also true the other way around, although the influence of sentiment on stock
market returns is much weaker. In two studies, Solt and Statman (1988) and Clarke and
Statman (1998) examine a sentiment indicator that is published by Investors Intelligence
(II) and based on the number of newsletters that are bullish, neutral, or bearish. In the
time periods 1963 to 1985 and 1963 to 1995, they find, in weekly measurements, that
sentiment does not influence stock market returns31 over a 4, 26, and 52 week horizon.
However, sentiment is influenced by returns that are lagged over these horizons. They
attribute the wrong beliefs in the forecasting abilities of newsletter writers to different
errors in the cognition of investors (e.g. “hot hand fallacy”, “Muller-Lyer illusion”, and
“illusions of validity”).32 Brown and Cliff (2005) find that the same Investors Intelligence
indicator does indeed affect asset values and their deviation from fundamental values in
the long-run.33 They also test other proxies for investor sentiment (e.g. CEFD, fund flows)
and find mixed and weak influence. A different survey-based measure of investors expec-
tations and confidence is investigated by Shiller (2000). He asked institutional investors
about their bubble expectations and confidence every half year between 1989 and 1999.
He shows that there exist rather weak relations between his sentiment indicators and the
lagged changes in stock prices.34 In addition, he investigates the correlation between these
and other commonly used sentiment indicators (e.g. CEFD, Investors Intelligence). The
30They additionally show that the correlation between CEFD and MCCI is low.
31As returns those of the Dow Jones Industrial Average are used.
32See Solt and Statman (1988), pp. 50-54.
33The authors investigate 6, 12, 24, and 36 month horizons.
34See Glaser and Weber (2005) for a comprehensive survey of the related strand of literature that analyzes the link
between past returns and stock return expectations.
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main result is that the different sentiment measures are not correlated. Fisher and Stat-
man (2000) test three survey-based sentiment measures for different clienteles: (i) mean
allocation to stocks in the recommended portfolios of sell-side strategists, (ii) Investors
Intelligence indicator, and (iii) small investor sentiment from the American Association
of Individual Investors (AAII). They find a high correlation between the two latter mea-
sures but hardly any with the first measure. The first and the third measures are reliable
contrary indicators for future stock market returns (S&P 500), while the second is not.
The sentiment of the second and third group of investors is positively influenced by prior
stock market returns, while sell-side analysts are not.
Another common way to measure investor sentiment is to compare buy with sell transac-
tions of individual investors. The usual measure is the difference between bought and sold
volume divided by the sum of both. In their closely related studies, Kumar and Lee (2002)
and Kumar and Lee (2004) show that over a six year period (1991-1996) the sentiment
indicator, based on the transaction behavior of 60,000 individual investors from a major
US discount brokerage house, has explanatory power for excess returns of small stocks,
value stocks, stocks with low institutional ownership, and low priced stocks, but is uncor-
related with the overall market movement. An additional result of their studies is that the
trading behavior of individual investors can explain the comovement in stock returns. In
contrast, Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) find little correlation between transactions of
individuals across stocks on a daily basis. They show that individuals act as contrarians
(e.g. buy after stock price declines) and that sentiment, measured in the way described
above, is a predictor of future stock market returns. Additional sentiment measures are
provided by Baker and Stein (2003). They measure investor sentiment from 1927 to 1998
(yearly) by the liquidity of the stock market in two ways: (i) turnover35 and (ii) equity
issuance36. In their model, they find that these sentiment measures are highly correlated
and have predictive power for future market returns.
Three studies that are methodologically close to ours are those of Wang, Keswani, and
Taylor (2006), Brown and Cliff (2004), and Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2004).
35Turnover is measured as the ratio of reported NYSE share volume to average shares listed.
36Equity issuance is measured as the ratio of common and preferred issues to the sum of these two items plus public and
private debt issues.
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The first two test various proxies for investor sentiment within a vector autoregressive
(VAR) model to investigate the mutual influence between those measures and market
variables like returns and volatility. Wang, Keswani, and Taylor (2006) find that senti-
ment, measured by AAII, II, put-call trading volume, open interest, and ARMS37, do
not Granger-cause stock market returns (S&P 100) or stock market volatility.38 However,
they find influence of the market returns as well as of the volatility on future values of the
sentiment measures. Similar results are provided by Brown and Cliff (2004). They first
test different sentiment measures39 and find strong contemporaneous relations between
changes in these proxies and near-term stock market returns. Relying on principal com-
ponent analysis, they elicit their own sentiment indicator to obtain a cleaner measure of
investor sentiment. They test the mutual influence of their indicator and stock market
returns in a VAR model and show only limited evidence that their sentiment measure
forecasts stock market returns. In contrast, they find strong evidence that returns in-
fluence the level of as well as changes in the sentiment measure. Dorn, Huberman, and
Sengmueller (2004) detect a tendency of herding within a group of individual investors
from an online broker measured by the herding measure of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1992). Additionally, they test the forecasting power of a sentiment variable, the
buy ratio40, for stock returns with a VAR model. They find a positive relation between
net trading by individuals and returns.41 Their results are especially strong in the very
short-run (daily frequency).
37ARMS is defined as number of advancing issues scaled by the number of traded shares of advancing issues divided by
the same ratio for declining issues.
38An exception is the ARMS index where Wang, Keswani, and Taylor (2006) find some forecasting ability.
39They test e.g. the ratio of advancers to decliners, ARMS, the ratio of stocks with new highs to those with new lows,
the put/call ratio, the CEFD, fund flows, number of IPOs etc.
40The buy ratio is similar to the sentiment measures of Kumar and Lee (2002) and Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) but
uses the numbers of investors instead of the volume bought and sold. This makes the measure robust against the behavior
of a few wealthy individuals.
41This positive relation disappears if limit orders, in addition to the here used market orders, are also considered in the
analysis.
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4 Sentiment Measures, Data Set, and Methodology
We propose a measure of investor sentiment that is derived from warrant transactions in
the market of bank-issued warrants. The underlying assumption is that people reveal their
expectations about the future development of the underlyings of the warrants by holding
call or put warrants. Since the value of a call tends to rise if the price of the underlying
rises and the value of a put rises if the price of the underlying declines, holding a call is
regarded as positive expectation, while holding a put is regarded as negative expectation
for the underlying. By looking at the holdings of warrants, we can avoid the problem that
occurs with sentiment indicators that compare buy with sell transactions.42 As mentioned
earlier, the problem is that buy and sell decisions in stocks differ in some aspects. In theory,
informed as well as noise traders are equally likely to make purchases or sales either
based on the information available to them or randomly. In contrast, Barber and Odean
(2005) show that the buying behavior, especially of individual investors, is influenced by
attention grabbing events such as abnormal volume and extreme one day price moves.
The underlying idea is that individual investors are not able or willing (because of high
transaction costs) to sell stocks they do not already own (short selling). Thus, they face
different search problems when making buy or sell decisions. To purchase a stock, they
have to choose from a set of several thousand different assets. Due to their cognitive
limitations and time constraints, they are not able to analyze all these stocks and thus
focus on stocks that recently caught their attention. Furthermore, a robust phenomenon
when looking at selling decisions is the so-called “disposition effect”.43 Odean (1998) shows
that individual investors are more reluctant to realize their losses than they are willing to
sell their winners and that this finding cannot be fully explained by rational reasons like
portfolio rebalancing or expectations about future price movements.
If one takes these points into consideration, the elicitation of investor sentiment from the
trading behavior in stocks by comparing buy and sell transactions44 is at least question-
42Analogously to the buy ratio of Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2004), we also calculated a sentiment measure that
compares purchases in calls (instead of stock purchases) and puts (instead of stock sales) for every investor in a specific time
period. The results (unreported here) are the same with regard to the direction of influence, but we obtain less observations
per day, making the results a little less reliable.
43See Shefrin and Statman (1985).
44See Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2004), Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) and Kumar and Lee (2002).
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able. By looking at the transactions of individual investors in the warrant market, one
can overcome these difficulties. This is due to the simple fact that investors can buy call
and put warrants for the same transaction costs.45 Since the holder of a put warrant earns
money if the underlying loses its value, buying a put warrant is a kind of “short sale” of
the underlying. Our assumption is that an investor who holds a call warrant reveals his
positive sentiment about the underlying while the holder of a put warrant shows negative
sentiment. Since we do not compare buy and sell transactions, we avoid the problems
associated with differences in buying and selling behavior.
Additionally, our sentiment measure has some advantages compared to other proxies of
investor sentiment. Due to a data set from a big German online brokerage, we are able to
measure sentiment at the individual investor level. Furthermore, the investors are private
investors (median buy transaction volume is 1,886 Euros), and we look at transactions
in warrants only, which are almost exclusively traded by individuals. Thus, we capture
sentiment of individual investors only. It is a lot more difficult to control for the clienteles
if one is looking at the CEFD or data from the option market as sentiment measures.
The advantage over the CEFD is that rational investors have no incentive to buy war-
rants, since arbitrage is virtually impossible in this market. This is because the seller of
the warrants is always a financial institution. As mentioned before, it is unlikely that the
financial institutions would sell a warrant for less than its theoretical price. Rational in-
stitutional investors could only gain from arbitrage if the warrants would be “too cheap”.
If, in contrast, the discount in a closed-end fund exceeds its rationally justified amount,
there is a possibility of arbitrage in buying the fund and selling the corresponding port-
folio short.46 This could induce institutional trading in closed-end funds. Other popular
sentiment indicators are derived from the option market. They compare the number of (or
volume traded in) call and put options or the contracts that are not closed at the end of
a time period (“open interest”).47 This is methodologically close to what we are looking
at but has one big disadvantage. Similar to the CEFD one cannot distinguish clienteles.
45E.g. transactions in warrants on the DAX are in 55.67 % cases call warrants and in 44,33% put warrants.
46Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), p. 83, argue that there are some limitations to arbitrage. Besides the problem of
portfolio adjustment and costly short sales, the main argument is that there is a “discount risk” if the time horizon of
the arbitrageur is not infinite. The takeover of the whole fund and sale of all assets as ultimative way of arbitrage is also
discussed. The authors regard that as unlikely due to managerial resistance and regulatory restrictions in practice.
47See Wang, Keswani, and Taylor (2006).
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Since warrants are typical retail banking products that are bought by individual investors
and because we look at online brokerage accounts we are able to measure the sentiment
of the clientele of individual investors. In the option market, it is unclear who sells the
contracts to whom. If, for example, only put contracts have been traded in a time period,
the put/call-ratio would indicate strong pessimism. Since there are always two parties
involved in an option contract it is difficult, if not impossible, to infer investor sentiment.
The buyer of the put could be regarded as pessimistic, while at the same time the seller
should then be optimistic. To be consistent with theory, the differentiation in clienteles is
essential.
There are a couple of sentiment indicators that can precisely differentiate clienteles. They
do so by asking people directly in some kind of survey. There are surveys of institutional
and individual investors, as well as managers and consumers that are regarded as senti-
ment indicators by different authors48. The problem all these surveys have in common is
that they cannot control for what the participants are actually doing. There might be a
divergence between what the participants answer and what they actually do in the stock
market. There might be incentives not to reveal the true expectations if one knows that
this could potentially influence stock prices in an undesired direction. If, for example,
somebody owns stocks because he expects prices to raise in the future and he knows that
a bullish result in a survey is regarded as contra-indicator, he has an incentive to answer
as if he were bearish, even though he is not. Furthermore, Glaser, Langer, Reynders, and
Weber (2005) show that stock return expectations are easily influenced by the specific
elicitation mode used in questionnaire studies (i.e. whether forecasters have to state fu-
ture price levels or directly future returns). They find that there is a highly significant
framing effect. For upward sloping time series, the return forecasts given by investors
who are asked directly for returns are significantly higher than those stated by investors
who are asked for prices. For downward sloping time series, the return forecasts given by
investors who are asked directly for returns are significantly lower than those stated by
investors who are asked for prices.
We derive our sentiment measure from a data set of daily transactions of individual in-
vestors who had accounts at a big German online brokerage between January 1997 to
48See for some examples Qui and Welch (2004), Shiller (2000), and Fisher and Statman (2000).
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April 2001. The data set contains transaction data49 at the individual level for different
groups of securities. While research on individual investor behavior has predominantly
focused on stock trades50, we analyze individual investors transactions in the market for
bank-issued warrants. Information about stock market returns and the traded warrants51
are obtained from different data sources. Returns of the DAX and SDAX are from Datas-
tream. The German online broker reported the warrant information for roughly half of
the warrants traded. In addition to this data set, we obtained data from the Euwax52,
which provides data from November 1999 onwards, and from the Karlsruher Kapitalmarkt
Datenbank (KKMDB), a capital markets research data base in Germany. The data sets
from various suppliers make it possible to double-check our data. We combined the data
sets and compared the characteristics of the warrants and did not find any discrepancies.53
In the category “warrants”, the online broker also includes structured retail products like
discount certificates and reverse convertibles that are traded on the same market places
as the plain-vanilla warrants. We excluded those products (3,868) which are identified
as non-plain-vanilla warrants, and these (667) where the necessary information was not
available (e.g. no strike price, type etc.). After matching the information about the trans-
actions and the attributes of the warrants, we tested whether the reported total volume
traded equals the number of warrants traded multiplied by the trade price. This was not
the case in 78 transactions, which we excluded. We also excluded the 415 transactions
in warrants that are not quoted in DEM or EUR. The remaining sample of plain-vanilla
bank-issued warrant transactions consists of 103,904 transactions in 8,066 warrants from
1,499 investors (see Tables 1 and 2).
49The data set contains: the account number of the individuals, the date of the transaction, the security identifier (WKN),
the number of securities traded, a purchase or sale indicator, the traded price per security, the transaction costs per trade,
the total transaction volume, and the currency of the security.
50Examples are Odean (1998), Odean (1999), and Gervais and Odean (2001). Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2000) and
Brown, Goetzmann, Hiraki, Shiraishi, and Watanabe (2002) looking at the transactions of individual investors in the
market for mutual funds.
51The information consists of the type (call or put), the underlying, the strike price, the issuer, the maturity date, the
style (European or American), and the conversion ratio of the warrants.
52The European Warrant Exchange (Euwax) is the biggest exchange for bank-issued warrants worldwide. More than half
of all the warrants are issued in Germany (see Voirin (2001), p. 4) and more than 80% of all trades in Germany were
executed on the Euwax (see Euwax (2001)) in 2000.
53In a few cases there were differences in the second position after the decimal point. These differences result from
imprecise conversion from Deutsche Mark to Euro. We then kept the true value.
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We divide these plain-vanilla warrants into five subcategories depending on the type of
their underlying. Although the majority of warrants in the sample have a stock as under-
lying (56.93%), most of the transactions are in index warrants (47.71%). The remaining
categories are currency, interest rate and commodity warrants (see Table 2). Since we
analyze the influence of individual investor sentiment on stock market returns and vice
versa, we exclude all currency, interest rate, and commodity warrants from our analysis.
6,827 warrants with stocks or indexes as underlying, accounting for 90,342 transactions
made by 1,455 individuals remain.54
We calculate our sentiment measure from the holdings of bank-issued warrants by indi-
vidual investors from a big German online brokerage. Using daily data, we identify those
investors who hold call warrants and/or put warrants or neither of them. We assume
that investors who hold call warrants only expect rising prices and thus show positive
sentiment. The exclusive holding of puts is regarded as as sign of pessimism, i.e. negative
sentiment. Investors who hold call and put warrants simultaneously as well as those who
do not hold any warrants on a particular day are classified as neutral. Table 3 shows the
mean and median number of investors per day in the three categories for all warrants
and warrants on the DAX. We choose to also look at warrants on the DAX separately for
three reasons. First, it is the underlying that by far the most warrants are traded on (see
Table 4). Second, the DAX, in contrast to other underlyings, cannot be purchased directly
on the stock market. Thus, it is a more symmetric decision situation when considering
buying a warrant on the DAX. Third, potential insider information, no matter whether
it is correct or not, is not very likely to play a role in the investment decision.
54887 individual investors trade index and stock warrants, 209 trade index warrants while 361 trade stock warrants only.
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We constructed our sentiment indicator as follows:
Sentt(u) =
Optt(u)− Pesst(u)
Allt(u)
(1)
with Allt(u) = Optt(u) +Neutt(u) + Pesst(u)
and Optt(u) =
Nt∑
i=1
1{Callt(u);NOPutt(u)},it
and Neutt(u) =
Nt∑
i=1
1{(Callt(u);Putt(u))∨(NOCallt(u);NOPutt(u))},it
and Pesst(u) =
Nt∑
i=1
1{NOCallt(u);Putt(u)},it
where Optt(u) (Neutt(u);Pesst(u)) is the number of optimistic (neutral; pessimistic)
individual investors on day t derived from holdings in warrants with u as an underlying
(u²{All;DAX}). It is the sum of dummy variables that indicate the N investors who
hold warrants on day t. The dummy for optimists is equal to 1 if the investor i holds at
least one call warrant but no put warrant ({Callt(u);NOPutt(u)}) on day t. For neutral
investors, the dummy is 1 if he hold calls as well as puts or if he does not hold any
warrants ({(Callt(u);Putt(u)) ∨ (NOCallt(u);NOPutt(u))}), and it is 1 for pessimists
if an investor holds puts but no calls ({NOCallt(u);Putt(u)}). Allt(u) is the sum of all
individuals who hold the underlying u at least once during the sample period.55 Sentt(u)
is constructed as the difference of optimists minus pessimists normalized by the number
of all traders in the respective period.56 The Sentt(u) values are in the range from -1
to 1. The indicator is 1 if there are only optimists in the market and -1 if there are
only pessimists. The existence of neutral investors always moves the indicator closer to
0, ceteris paribus. If the Sentt(u) is 0.5 it could, for example, mean that in that period
3 times more optimists than pessimists held warrants (no neutral investors), but it could
also be that the same number of optimistic and neutral investors (no pessimists) had
55We do not report results for a volume-weighted sentiment indicator because the average trading volume per trade and
investor is highly positively skewed (median: 1,659; mean: 2,687; STD: 3,659; skewness: 5.76), implying that there are some
traders who trade high volumes per trade but many who trade small volumes. The way we specified our sentiment measure
is robust against this behavior of a few wealthy individuals (see Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2004), p. 10.)
56This measure is very similar to the buy-ratio of Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) and is used as sentiment
indicator by Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2004), but they use buy and sell transactions instead of portfolio holdings.
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warrants in their portfolio.57
The goal of this paper is to analyze the link between stock market returns and investor
sentiment derived from the market for bank-issued warrants. As stock market indicators,
we use the daily returns of the DAX and the SDAX. The DAX contains the shares of the
30 biggest listed German companies while the SDAX contains small companies that are
listed in Germany. We chose the DAX because it is the most important market indicator in
Germany and because most of the transactions in warrants have the DAX as underlying.
The SDAX was chosen because theory suggests that individual investors have a stronger
impact on prices of small firms. We analyze whether returns influence individual investor
sentiment or if there is reverse causality indicating that sentiment influences returns. We
use three methods to investigate the connection between individual investor sentiment
and stock market returns.
The first method investigates whether there is a contemporaneous relation between our
sentiment indicators and stock market returns. Four different cases are possible, resulting
in four categories: (i) both move up (i.e. positive returns and the sentiment indicator
increases), (ii) Sentiment moves up while stock market return is negative, (iii) Sentiment
declines while the stock market goes up, and (iv) Sentiment and stock market both decline
simultaneously. The analysis is not only carried out for the very same day but also with
lags in both of the compared indicators. We include 10 lags.58 If the sentiment indicator
and stock market returns move independently, one would expect that in 50 percent of all
time periods, the two indicators move in the same direction (e.g. category (i) and (iv)),
while in the other 50 percent of the time periods, the indicators move in the opposite
direction (e.g. category (ii) and (iii)). To test this, we create a dummy that takes the
value of one if the indicators move in the same direction and zero otherwise and apply a
57Because Sentt(u) states a proportion only (the indicator would have the same value if there are three optimists and
one pessimist or if there are 75 optimists and 25 pessimists), we constructed an additional indicator that measures the
individual investor sentiment in numbers of investors. It is, in principle, the difference in the number of optimistic and
pessimistic investors but adjusted to account for neutral investors. We multiplied the difference by an “adjustment factor”
which is 1 if there are no neutral investors in the market and 0 if there are no optimists and no pessimists. It is the sum of
optimists and pessimists divided by the number of all investors in period t. Neutrals move the indicator level towards zero.
Unreported results for the so specified sentiment indicator are similar to the numbers reported in Section 5.
58This lag length choice is motivated by the short warrant holding periods of the investors in our data set. The median
holding period is 9 days. Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2004) also find influence only in the short-run.
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two-sided binomial probability test.
As a second method to investigate the relation between the sentiment measures and stock
returns we estimate vector autoregressive (VAR) models. Brown and Cliff (2004) also
estimate the relation between investor sentiment and near-term stock returns using VAR
models. Again, 10 lags are included in our daily investigation. We estimate the following
two regressions simultaneously:
Mat = α1 +
P∑
i=1
β1iM
a
t−i +
P∑
i=1
δ1iSentt−i(u) + ε1t
Sentt(u) = α2 +
P∑
i=1
β2iM
a
t−i +
P∑
i=1
δ2iSentt−i(u) + ε2t
(2)
where Ma is the return of the stock market for indicator a (a²{DAX,SDAX}) and
Sentc(u) is our sentiment measure. Since Brown and Cliff (2004) showed that the abso-
lute value of a sentiment indicator as well as the change in investor sentiment could be
correlated with stock market returns, we decided to test both versions of our sentiment
measure. The specification of the VAR model with the change of our sentiment measure
is:
Mat = α1 +
P∑
i=1
β1iM
a
t−i +
P∑
i=1
δ1i∆Sentt−i(u) + ε1t
∆Sentt(u) = α2 +
P∑
i=1
β2iM
a
t−i +
P∑
i=1
δ2i∆Sentt−i(u) + ε2t
(3)
The βs are the coefficients for the lagged stock returns while the δs are the coefficients for
the influence of the lagged sentiment indicator on the dependent variable. βs in the first
equations and δs in the second equations of the VAR models 2 and 3 are coefficients for
autocorrelation. P is the number of lagged periods (P = 10) while t is the respective day.
To get closer insights as to whether sentiment influences returns or returns influence
sentiment we also apply Granger-causality tests.59 The null hypothesis of this test is that
all coefficients of the variables that are not lags of the dependent variable in an equation
2 type of regression are jointly zero. This would imply that there is no influence on the
59For details see Granger (1969).
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dependent variable. Inversely, a variable Granger-causes another if the lags of this variable
help to better explain the value of the dependent variable.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Correlation of Sentiment Measures and Stock Returns
We calculated the sentiment indicators described in section 4 from the holdings of indi-
vidual investors in warrants with all underlyings and warrants with the DAX alone as
the underlying. A correlation analysis60 shows that the hypothesis that the returns of the
market indicators are independent from the level and changes of the sentiment measures
can be rejected in most cases. This is especially true if sentiment is measured as the daily
change of investors’ warrant holdings. The correlation coefficients are negative in all cases,
meaning that sentiment is better or changes in sentiment are positive if market returns
are negative on the same day. Individual investors hold and buy more call warrants if the
value of stocks decline. This is also known as contrarian behavior.61 Whether this negative
correlation exists only contemporaneously or if this is also the case for lagged values of
sentiment and returns is subject to the investigations in the next sections. The sentiment
measures are highly correlated with each other if both are measured either on the level
(Spearman’s rho 0.6564) or the change (0.6899) basis. Otherwise, the correlation is low
and not significantly different from zero (see Table 5).
5.2 Comovement of Sentiment Measures and Stock Returns
To see whether changes in investor sentiment and stock market returns move in the same
direction within the same period and in lagged periods, we classify the movement into
the four categories described in Section 4. In Table 6, one can find an example of this
classification.
60Spearman rank correlation coefficients are reported. We obtain qualitatively similar results when we calculate Bravais-
Pearson correlations.
61See Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004).
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Table 6 shows that returns of the DAX and changes in the ∆Sent(All) (lag 0 = no
lag) increased simultaneously on 314 of 1,080 days and decreased together on 208 days,
while they moved in different directions on 558 (284+274) days. A two-sided binomial
probability test shows that the 522 (558) moves in the same (different) direction are not
significantly less (more) than the 540 (1080/2) expected moves for both categories. Thus,
the null hypothesis that the movements of the sentiment indicator and the stock market
returns are independent cannot be rejected. In Table 7, we present the results of this
analysis for all combinations of changes in our sentiment indicators with the different
stock market returns. The table shows the number of simultaneous moves in the same
period (lag 0) and when lags (lag 1 to lag 10) are used. “Sentiment” lag 1 to lag 10 means
that the stock market returns are compared with lag 1 up to lag 10 of the sentiment
indicator respectively. Table 7 shows that when market returns are lagged one and two
days there exists a significant difference in simultaneous moves and moves in the opposite
direction. Since a value smaller than 540 indicates that sentiment and market returns
move into different directions, i.e. the correlation is negative, and all significant values are
below this barrier, the results are in line with those from the former subsection. This also
indicates contrarian behavior of individual investors. With the described method, we do
not obtain such a significant relationship in the first two lags if the sentiment measure is
the lagged variable. When this is the case, there is only mild evidence that the time series
are related. Significant differences only occur if sentiment is measured from holdings in
DAX warrants and if SDAX returns are considered. However, altogether the influence of
sentiment on market returns seems to be low, and market returns influence changes in
investor sentiment with lags of one and two days when the comovement is measured in
the univariate way described above.
5.3 Mutual influence of sentiment and stock markets: VAR regression results
To get further insights into the structure of the mutual influence of sentiment and stock
market returns we apply the vector-autoregressive (VAR) model described before. In Table
8 we present the results of one VAR model. Here we tested the mutual influence of DAX
returns and changes in our sentiment measure that is based on transactions in warrants
on all underlyings. The bold coefficients are those we are interested in, because they
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show the influence of returns on sentiment and vice versa. The other coefficients are of
minor interest, but one need to control for autocorrelation, because otherwise the other
coefficients might be overstated. We find a small amount of autocorrelation in the first
lag. Since this fact holds for all specifications of our model, for the other VAR models
we only show coefficients for the lagged variables, that are no lags of the dependent
variable.62 From Tables 9 and 10 it can be seen that mutual influence is mainly present
in the first two lagged periods, meaning that there exists an influence only in the very
short-run. The impact from our sentiment measure on returns is significantly positive
with a one period lag, no matter how our measure is specified (based on holdings in all
warrants or warrants on the DAX and on a level (Table 9) or difference (Table 10) basis)
and which market returns (DAX or SDAX returns) are investigated.63 This means that,
in aggregate, investors are right with their expectations, at least for the day following
a change in their holdings of warrants. We detect a significantly negative influence in
the second lag and thus a reversal compared to the first period, but only if sentiment
is measured on the level basis. When we look at the influence of market returns on
sentiment, we find that the influence is significantly negative for lags 1 and 2, no matter
whether our sentiment measure is specified as level or difference indicator. These results
are in line with the contrarian behavior shown in the former subsections and also found
by other authors64. The p-values are smaller, which indicates that the influence of the
returns on sentiment is stronger than it is the other way around. This effect was found by
most of the other empirical studies on the comovement of sentiment and stock returns as
well.65 Additionally, we find that investor sentiment is more strongly influenced by market
returns when we infer our measure from the holdings in DAX warrants than when it is
calculated based on holdings in all warrants. In contrast, the influence of sentiment on
market returns is stronger when our sentiment measure is based on all warrant holdings.
We obtain similar results if we differentiate between the market returns. The impact of
returns on sentiment seems to be slightly higher in absolute numbers but less reliable
62We only report βs and δs for the first 5 lags, although the VAR model is specified with 10 lags, for the reasons of
lucidity and because we found no systematic significance in higher lags.
63Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2004) and Qui and Welch (2004) find similar results.
64See e.g. Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004). That there exists mutual influence only in the short-run was also found by
Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2004).
65See Brown and Cliff (2004), Otoo (1999), Solt and Statman (1988), and Wang, Keswani, and Taylor (2006).
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when SDAX returns are considered. However, sentiment has a stronger influence on DAX
than on SDAX returns. This finding does not coincide with the conventional wisdom that
individual investors have a stronger impact on small stock returns, at least if company size
is a proxy for the ratio of institutional to private holdings of the shares in that company
and thus for the influence of individual investors on the stock price.
5.4 Mutual influence of sentiment and stock markets: Granger-causality tests
To gain further insights into the direction and the strength of the relationship between
individual investor sentiment and market returns we apply Granger-causality tests for
the first two lags of both variables in all specifications.66 Table 11 shows the results. By
looking at the p-values, we find that the influence of market returns on sentiment is always
stronger than vice versa. DAX returns always have a stronger influence on sentiment than
SDAX returns. The results are mixed if the influence of sentiment on the returns is
investigated. Sentiment has a stronger influence on DAX returns when it is measured on
a change basis. This is not always the case when we use the level sentiment indicator. In
this case we obtain mixed results. Another result is that mutual influence is stronger with
a lag of one instead of two periods if our sentiment measure is based on changes in the
holdings. The opposite is found if the sentiment is a level indicator.
5.5 Summary of the empirical results
Taking all results together, we find that there is a mutual influence of sentiment, measured
as holdings of warrants, and stock market returns in the very short-run. Since warrants
are held for a very short time period (median holding period is 9 days for all warrants), it
is not surprising that there only exists influence in the days surrounding a change in the
holdings. An additional result is that the statistical influence of market returns, especially
of the main German index DAX, on sentiment is stronger than vice versa. This is also
not surprising, because the main indices receive a lot of attention and thus may strongly
influence beliefs of individual investors about future stock prices. However, since private
66We did not optimize the lag length by using information criteria, like the Akaike or Schwarz information criterion,
because we wanted to investigate the influence on the following two trading days.
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investors usually only hold a small portion of the shares outstanding of listed companies,
their influence on prices (in comparison to institutional investors), and thus returns, might
also be small. Theory suggests that the influence of individuals is greater if they hold
relatively more shares in a company. When this amount is approximated by the size of
the companies, we cannot confirm this prediction in our data set, because the impact
of investor sentiment on DAX and SDAX returns does not differ significantly. Recent
related studies show that past market returns have a strong influence on trading activity.
Glaser and Weber (2005) show that the effect of past market returns on subsequent
trading volume of individual investors is stronger than that of own past realized portfolio
returns. Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2004) find that “not only does that impact of
past market returns on a typical security’s trading activity survive the inclusion of lagged
security returns in the same regression, it appears that the lagged market return impact
is actually larger”67. Nicolosi, Peng, and Zhu (2003) also find in their regressions that
the impact of past market returns on stock purchases is stronger than the effect of past
portfolio returns.68 All these studies have in common that past returns that are highly
visible to investors affect behavior more than returns that are less visible or that have to
be calculated by investors themselves, such as own past realized portfolio returns or the
returns of some individual stocks. Another finding is that DAX returns influence sentiment
more strongly than SDAX returns. It is no surprise that past DAX returns affect trading
behavior and thus our sentiment measures. In contrast to the returns of small stocks,
which are aggregated in the SDAX, the DAX return is in the news every day.
5.6 Robustness and Discussion
To see whether our results are also valid for sub-samples we conducted some robustness
checks. We divided the sample into different periods and repeated the VAR analysis as
well as the granger causality tests (see Table 12). First, the sample was separated into a
rising and a declining stock market. The bullish market period lasted from the beginning
of our sample until March 7th, 2000, when the DAX reached its high with 8,064.97 points
at that day’s closing bell. The bearish market started the next day and lasted up to the
67Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink (2004), p. 22.
68See Nicolosi, Peng, and Zhu (2003), Table 2.
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end of our sample. We additionally subdivided the sample into the single years.69 The
analysis shows that the results were qualitatively similar in all periods with regard to
direction of the influence, but with a much weaker reliability in the bear market and the
later years of the sample. The influence of the DAX on sentiment was significant in all
periods, while the influence of the SDAX on sentiment was significant in most periods. It
was not significant in the bear market, which is mainly due to the weak correlation in the
year 2000. The influence of sentiment on market returns, which was weaker in the whole
sample, was reliable only in the bull market. In the bear market, sentiment influenced
SDAX returns but not DAX returns, which is in line with the theoretical prediction that
the influence of individuals is bigger on small stock returns, what we did not find for the
whole sample. All together, we found that our results are stronger in upward moving stock
markets.
The specification of our sentiment measure, as shown in equation 1, might be another
factor that is driving our results. We tested our models with two other specifications of
our sentiment measure. First, we changed the definition of the neutral investor. In the
new specification the dummy for the neutral investor becomes one, only if the investor
holds call and put warrants at the same time. Thus we only consider investors that
are invested in warrants on the particular day in time. The second alternative in the
calculation of our measure is, that we defined the difference of optimists and pessimists
as our sentiment indicator. We chose this measure to investigate whether the absolute
number of investors is an important factor in our analysis. The following simple example
should support this argument. While our original measure would have the same value if
there are 2 optimists and 1 pessimist or if there are 200 optimists and 100 pessimists in the
market, the alternative measure would indicate more positive sentiment in the latter case.
But the alternative would yield the same sentiment if there are 2 and 1 or if there are 200
and 199 optimists and pessimists. Since we do not know which one is the better definition
of sentiment, we modified our measure in the way described above. The VAR models with
these two alternative specifications of our sentiment measure show very similar results.
Another concern about the robustness of our results is that only a few traders could
drive the results in our study. By looking at the maximum trades per account in Table
69The year 2001 is not considered since data only exists up to mid April.
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1, one can see that there is at least one person that traded more than twice per day.
However, in our measure, these intra-day traders could account for only one data point
per day because we are comparing the number of traders and not the volume they trade.
That makes our measure less sensitive to the behavior of a few wealthy traders.70. We
also analyzed a volume-weighted measure and obtained slightly stronger results in the
same direction.71 In addition, investors are classified as neutral if they hold call and put
warrants in one period, which is more likely for investors who trade a lot. Since there are
on average 531 people for all warrants, and 197 people for DAX warrants are classified
as positive or negative investors (see Table 3), these intra-day traders should play only
a minor role. To be sure that this is true, we excluded all those traders who trade on
average more than once per day. There were 11 trader in that category, accounting for
15,009 transactions which we excluded. The results remained almost unchanged.
6 Conclusions
Several sentiment indicators have been proposed and investigated over the last 10 to 15
years. Overall, the empirical evidence for an influence of these sentiment indicators on
stock market returns and vice versa is mixed. Some authors find a significant influence,
others do not. In this paper we propose a measure of investor sentiment which is based on
the holdings of bank-issued warrants by individual investors. Our findings contribute to
the ongoing research in the sentiment literature as well as the literature of the behavior
of individuals in financial markets. Additionally, we are (to our best knowledge) the first
who empirically analyze investor behavior in the warrant market.
By exploiting the structure of the warrant market, we are able to construct and test a
measure of individual investor sentiment. Due to a large data set from a German discount
broker we can take a look at the daily individual transactions of private investors. Since
warrants are traded by individual investors only, we can precisely specify the clientele we
are looking at. Moreover, we can avoid the problems with different motives for buying and
70Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2004) specified their buy-ratio in a similar way (number of traders) while others,
Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2004) and Kumar and Lee (2002) among them, used a volume buy-ratio
71Results are not reported here, because we think that looking at the number of investors instead of the volume they
trade gives us the better measure of investor sentiment.
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selling transactions since call and put warrants can be traded for the same transaction
costs, and thus, individual investors can symmetrically bet on rising and falling prices of
the underlying. Furthermore, we are looking at actual transactions where the investors
put their own money at stake. This is an advantage over survey-based sentiment measures
that might be biased since people could have an incentive not to reveal their true beliefs,
depending on the interpretation and impact of the sentiment measure on stock prices.
We test the mutual relationship of our sentiment measure with stock market returns in a
VAR model and with Granger-causality test. We find that there exists such a relationship,
but only in the very short-run (one to two trading days). The influence of stock market
returns on sentiment is negative and stronger than it is the other way around where
the influence is positive. We only find weak evidence for the hypothesis that sentiment
influences small stock returns more strongly than big stock returns as it was suggested
by other authors.
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Table 1: Online Investors Warrant Transactions
Observations as well as transactions per account and transactions per warrant are numbers, the other figures are in EUR.
obs. mean std.dev. median min. max.
all transactions
transactions per account 1,499 69.3 176.8 21 1 2,533
transactions per warrant 8,066 12.9 30.0 4 1 620
transaction costs per transaction 103,904 19.2 21.8 12.2 0 645.3
purchases
volume per transaction 57,031 4,376.0 10,659.0 1,838.7 5.4 511,937.1
sales
volume per transaction 46,873 5,198.1 12,062.5 2,060.7 0 295,914.5
call purchases
volume per transaction 41,881 4,406.7 10,611.7 1,828.7 5.4 281,813.5
call sales
volume per transaction 33,701 5,405.7 12,352.7 2,113.9 0 237,130.4
put purchases
volume per transaction 15,150 4,291.2 10,788.4 1,868.8 9.0 511,937.1
put sales
volume per transaction 13,172 4,666.9 11,269.2 1,941.0 0 295,914.5
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Table 2: Warrant Categories
warrants transactions
type of underlying traders frequency percent frequency percent
stock warrants 1,248 4,592 56.93 40,772 39.24
index warrants 1,096 2,235 27.71 49,570 47.71
currency warrants 801 1,067 13.23 11,808 11.36
interest rate warrants 117 95 1.18 441 0.42
commodity warrants 167 77 0.95 1,313 1.26
total 1,499 8,066 100 103,904 100
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Table 3: Classified Warrant Holders Per Trading Day
Optimists Pessimists Neutrals
underlying investors mean median mean median mean median
All 1,455 453.6 441 92.9 90 908.5 912
DAX 944 115.1 114 91.5 83 737.4 738
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Table 4: The Ten Most Traded Underlyings (456 Underlyings Overall)
warrants transactions
underlying frequency percent frequency percent
DAX 30 1,212 17.75 36,734 40.66
S&P 500 173 2.01 3,150 3.47
Commerzbank 238 3.49 2,689 2.98
Dow Jones 30 134 1.96 2,355 2.61
Nasdaq 100 170 2.49 2,282 2.53
SAP 178 2.61 1,804 2.00
Nikkei 225 129 1.89 1,634 1.81
Deutsche Bank 142 2.08 1,612 1.78
Volkswagen 129 1.89 1,491 1.65
Nemax 50 184 2.70 1,415 1.57
total 2,689 39.39 55,166 61.06
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Table 5: Spearman Rank Correlation of the Time Series
This table shows Spearman’s rho and the respective p-values for the hypothesis that the two time series are independent.
* indicates significance at the 10 % level, ** indicates significance at the 5 % level, and *** indicates significance at the 1
% level.
Sent(All) ∆Sent(All) Sent(DAX) ∆Sent(DAX) Return DAX Return SDAX
Sent(All) 1
∆Sent(All) 0.0361 1
0.2356
Sent(DAX) 0.6564*** -0.0479 1
0.0000 0.1155
∆Sent(DAX) 0.1100*** 0.6899*** 0.0474 1
0.0003 0.0000 0.1195
Return DAX -0.0722** -0.0856*** -0.0272 -0.2392*** 1
0.0178 0.0049 0.3725 0.0000
Return SDAX -0.0994*** -0.1062*** -0.0637** -0.1839*** 0.4526*** 1
0.0011 0.0005 0.0364 0.0000 0.0000
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Table 6: Example for Categories (DAX Returns; Sentd(All); lag=0)
lag 0 DAX
increase decrease
∆Sent(All) increase 314 284
decrease 274 208
40
Table 7: Univariate Comovement of Sentiment and the Stock Market Indicators
This table shows the number of periods (days) in which the change of the sentiment indicators and the returns of the market
indicators go in the same direction. The table presents results for the changes in the sentiment indicator based on holdings
in all (column 2 and 3) as well as in DAX (column 4 and 5) warrants. Market indicators are DAX and SDAX returns. Lag
0 indicates that we compare the change of the sentiment indicators and the returns of the market indicators on the same
day. Lag 1 to lag 10 indicate that we analyze the intertemporal relation between sentiment and market indicators with lags
of one to ten days, respectively. Lag 1 to lag 10 of our sentiment measure describe the cases in which we compare current
market indicators with the lagged sentiment indicator, i.e. the sentiment indicator one to ten days before. L1 to L10 of
DAX and SDAX describe the cases in which we compare current sentiment indicators with lagged market indicators. We
test the null hypothesis that the numbers presented are equal to 540 (1080 days divided by 2), using a binomial probability
test. * indicates significance at the 10 % level, ** indicates significance at the 5 % level, and *** indicates significance at
the 1 % level.
∆Sent(All) ∆Sent(DAX)
DAX SDAX DAX SDAX
lag 0 522 511* 454*** 483***
Sentiment
lag 1 543 556 551 524
lag 2 533 534 559 534
lag 3 531 526 517 498**
lag 4 534 529 540 521
lag 5 546 515 539 508*
lag 6 540 541 543 522
lag 7 527 516 548 539
lag 8 548 515 545 534
lag 9 533 548 545 530
lag 10 531 536 553 500**
Market Returns
lag 1 456*** 508* 438*** 472***
lag 2 486*** 528 446*** 502**
lag 3 538 554 520 520
lag 4 564 552 542 528
lag 5 537 550 487*** 524
lag 6 563 546 557 530
lag 7 569* 563 541 531
lag 8 548 556 560 550
lag 9 561 565 563 575**
lag 10 534 519 516 521
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Table 8: Example for Results of one Vector Autoregressive Model
The reported βs, δs, and p-values are from the VAR model with 10 lags. The dependent variables are the DAX returns and
changes in our sentiment indicator, that is based on holdings in all underlyings.
Mat = α1 +
P∑
i=1
β1iM
a
t−i +
P∑
i=1
δ1i∆Sentt−i(u) + ε1t
∆Sentt(u) = α2 +
P∑
i=1
β2iM
a
t−i +
P∑
i=1
δ2i∆Sentt−i(u) + ε2t
The bold coefficients show the influence of the lagged value of one indicator on the other indicator. The other coefficients
show potential autocorrelation. *** (**, *) indicates significance on the 1% (5%, 10%) level.
Dependent variable
DAX return ∆Sent(All)
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
DAX return
β•1 0.051 (0.096)* -0.059 (0.000)***
β•2 -0.020 (0.532) -0.034 (0.000)***
β•3 -0.014 (0.664) -0.012 (0.096)*
β•4 0.015 (0.652) 0.004 (0.596)
β•5 -0.009 (0.792) -0.002 (0.793)
β•6 -0.038 (0.242) 0.006 (0.396)
β•7 -0.075 (0.020)** 0.004 (0.627)
β•8 -0.007 (0.822) 0.005 (0.466)
β•9 -0.034 (0.292) 0.007 (0.356)
β•10 0.028 (0.380) 0.001 (0.890)
∆Sent(All)
δ•1 0.507 (0.000)*** 0.064 (0.038)**
δ•2 -0.070 (0.615) 0.042 (0.180)
δ•3 -0.116 (0.403) 0.042 (0.178)
δ•4 -0.152 (0.273) 0.037 (0.232)
δ•5 -0.141 (0.310) 0.009 (0.785)
δ•6 0.087 (0.530) -0.023 (0.468)
δ•7 -0.175 (0.207) 0.013 (0.675)
δ•8 0.003 (0.984) -0.012 (0.700)
δ•9 -0.191 (0.162) 0.014 (0.645)
δ•10 0.037 (0.780) 0.047 (0.114)
Constant 0.001 (0.069)* 0.000 (0.017)**
R2 0.032 0.1168
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Table 11: Granger-causality Tests
This table reports the F-statistics of the Granger-causality test between our sentiment measures and stock market returns.
Results in Panel A and Panel B are for lags of one and two periods. Column 1 indicates which warrants are used to calculate
the sentiment measure. Column 2 shows the direction of the influence. Column 3 and 5 report the F-statistic and Columns
4 and 6 the respective p-values. “Level” and “Change” refer to the way the sentiment measure is constructed. The tested
hypothesis is that the indicator named first in the column “Direction of Influence” does not influence the indicator named
after the arrow.
Warrants Direction of Influence Level Change
Panel A: 1 lag
All Sent → DAX 3.03 0.0818 15.44 0.0001
DAX → Sent 80.69 0.0000 71.29 0.0000
Sent → SDAX 8.84 0.0030 8.87 0.0030
SDAX → Sent 31.19 0.0000 22.71 0.0000
DAX Sent → DAX 0.00 0.9535 22.14 0.0000
DAX → Sent 121.45 0.0000 93.99 0.0000
Sent → SDAX 3.10 0.0780 5.38 0.0205
SDAX → Sent 56.97 0.0000 36.44 0.0000
Panel B: 2 lags
All Sent → DAX 8.24 0.0003 6.77 0.0012
DAX → Sent 49.35 0.0000 49.43 0.0000
Sent → SDAX 9.06 0.0001 6.30 0.0019
SDAX → Sent 14.94 0.0000 14.07 0.0000
DAX Sent → DAX 9.71 0.0001 9.68 0.0001
DAX → Sent 61.52 0.0000 60.81 0.0000
Sent → SDAX 4.75 0.0088 3.66 0.0260
SDAX → Sent 22.17 0.0000 20.91 0.0000
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Table 12: Granger-causality Tests Through Time
This table reports the F-statistics of the Granger-causality test with a lag of two periods between the changes in our
sentiment measures and stock market returns. Column 1 indicates which warrants are used to calculate the sentiment
measure. Column 2 shows the direction of the influence. Under the F-statistic one can find the respective p-values. The
results in Columns 3 and 4 are granger causalities for the rising (“bull”) stock market from 01/02/1997 to 03/07/2000 and
the declining (“bear”) market from 03/08/2000 to 04/12/2001. Columns 5 to 8 report results for single years. Year 2001 is
not considered since data only exists up to middle of April. The tested hypothesis is that the indicator named first in the
column “Direction of Influence” does not influence the indicator named after the arrow.
Warrants Direction of Influence Bull Bear 1997 1998 1999 2000
market market
All Sent → DAX 6.51 0.72 3.38 2.91 3.05 1.10
0.0016 0.4863 0.0355 0.0563 0.0490 0.3349
DAX → Sent 43.92 3.46 23.37 13.07 6.12 16.31
0.0000 0.0327 0.0000 0.0000 0.0026 0.0000
Sent → SDAX 4.75 3.31 2.63 3.53 0.41 2.53
0.0089 0.0382 0.0744 0.0307 0.6628 0.0820
SDAX → Sent 15.73 0.01 6.63 5.73 3.64 0.82
0.0000 0.9867 0.0016 0.0037 0.0278 0.4404
DAX Sent → DAX 9.45 1.00 3.84 1.84 6.50 0.67
0.0001 0.3709 0.0229 0.1613 0.0018 0.5122
DAX → Sent 45.09 8.36 26.09 19.53 7.23 14.53
0.0000 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000
Sent → SDAX 3.70 4.17 3.18 2.89 0.15 0.73
0.0252 0.0164 0.0435 0.0577 0.8636 0.4827
SDAX → Sent 19.54 2.16 5.92 8.13 3.98 1.49
0.0000 0.1175 0.0031 0.0004 0.0199 0.2276
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Figure 1: Listed Warrants on Exchanges Worldwide in the Year 2000
Germany 55.7 55,7
Switzerland 1 11,1
France 10.1% 10,1
Italy 9.8% 9,8
Sweden 2.3% 2,3
Netherlands 2 2
Luxembourg 1 1,7
Australia 1.7% 1,7
Belgium 1.6% 1,6
Austria 1.0% 1
Others 3.0% 3
Italy 9.8%
Germany 55.7% 
Netherlands 2.0%
Others 3.0%
Austria 1.0%
Sweden 2.3%
Switzerland 11.1%
France 10.1%
Luxembourg 1.7%
Belgium 1.6%
Australia 1.7%
Source: International Warrant Institute (I.W.I.)
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